Monetary Union in West Africa : Who Might Gain, Who Might Lose, and Why? /
We develop a multicountry model in which governments aim at excessive spending in order to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. This puts pressure on the monetary authorities to extract seigniorage, and thus affects the incentives countries would have to participate in a monetary union....
| 第一著者: | |
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| その他の著者: | , |
| フォーマット: | 雑誌 |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
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| シリーズ: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2002/226 |
| オンライン･アクセス: | Full text available on IMF |
| 要約: | We develop a multicountry model in which governments aim at excessive spending in order to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. This puts pressure on the monetary authorities to extract seigniorage, and thus affects the incentives countries would have to participate in a monetary union. This feature, ignored by the monetary union literature for Europe, is potentially important in Africa. We calibrate the model to data for West Africa and use it to assess proposed ECOWAS monetary unions. We conclude that monetary union with Nigeria would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries, unless it were accompanied by effective discipline over Nigeria's fiscal policies. |
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| 記述事項: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| 物理的記述: | 1 online resource (35 pages) |
| フォーマット: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| アクセス: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |