Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization under Imperfect Credibility /

This paper analyzes stabilization policy under predetermined exchange rates in a cash-in-advance, staggered-prices model. Under full credibility, a reduction in the rate of devaluation results in an immediate and permanent reduction in the inflation rate, with no effect on output or consumption. In...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Calvo, Guillermo
Other Authors: Vegh Gramont, Carlos
Format: Journal
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1991.
Series:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1991/077
Online Access:Full text available on IMF
Description
Summary:This paper analyzes stabilization policy under predetermined exchange rates in a cash-in-advance, staggered-prices model. Under full credibility, a reduction in the rate of devaluation results in an immediate and permanent reduction in the inflation rate, with no effect on output or consumption. In contrast, a non-credible stabilization results in an initial expansion of output, followed by a later recession. The inflation rate of home goods remains above the rate of devaluation throughout the program, thus resulting in a sustained real exchange rate appreciation.
Item Description:<strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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Physical Description:1 online resource (34 pages)
Format:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
Access:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students