Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization under Imperfect Credibility /
This paper analyzes stabilization policy under predetermined exchange rates in a cash-in-advance, staggered-prices model. Under full credibility, a reduction in the rate of devaluation results in an immediate and permanent reduction in the inflation rate, with no effect on output or consumption. In...
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
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| অন্যান্য লেখক: | |
| বিন্যাস: | পত্রিকা |
| ভাষা: | English |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1991.
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| মালা: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1991/077 |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | Full text available on IMF |
| সংক্ষিপ্ত: | This paper analyzes stabilization policy under predetermined exchange rates in a cash-in-advance, staggered-prices model. Under full credibility, a reduction in the rate of devaluation results in an immediate and permanent reduction in the inflation rate, with no effect on output or consumption. In contrast, a non-credible stabilization results in an initial expansion of output, followed by a later recession. The inflation rate of home goods remains above the rate of devaluation throughout the program, thus resulting in a sustained real exchange rate appreciation. |
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| উপাদানের বিবরণ: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| দৈহিক বর্ননা: | 1 online resource (34 pages) |
| বিন্যাস: | Mode of access: Internet |
| আইএসএসএন: | 1018-5941 |
| প্রবেশাধিকার: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |