Money-Based Versus Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization : Is There Space for Political Opportunism? /
In response to high and chronic inflation, countries have adopted different stabilization policies. However, the extent to which these stabilization programs were designed for political motives is not clear. Since exchange-rate-based stabilizations (ERBS) create an initial consumption boom followed...
| Հիմնական հեղինակ: | |
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| Ձևաչափ: | Ամսագիր |
| Լեզու: | English |
| Հրապարակվել է: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2004.
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| Շարք: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2004/094 |
| Առցանց հասանելիություն: | Full text available on IMF |
| Ամփոփում: | In response to high and chronic inflation, countries have adopted different stabilization policies. However, the extent to which these stabilization programs were designed for political motives is not clear. Since exchange-rate-based stabilizations (ERBS) create an initial consumption boom followed by a contraction, whereas money-based stabilizations (MBS) generate a consumption bust followed by a recovery, policymakers may consider the timing of elections when determining the nominal anchor for stabilization. This paper finds strong evidence that the choice of nominal anchor depends on elections, implying the existence of political opportunism. ERBS are, on average, launched before elections while MBS are set after them. |
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| Նյութի նկարագրություն: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Ֆիզիկական նկարագրություն: | 1 online resource (35 pages) |
| Ձևաչափ: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Հասանելի: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |