Evaluating Policy Rules Under Imperfect Credibility /
Evaluation of policy rules using empirical macroeconomic models is usually done on the assumption that the rules are perfectly credible. However, there are usually circumstances that cause the authorities to abandon any given rule. The public's expectations reflect this possibility. In the pape...
| Հիմնական հեղինակ: | |
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| Այլ հեղինակներ: | |
| Ձևաչափ: | Ամսագիր |
| Լեզու: | English |
| Հրապարակվել է: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1991.
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| Շարք: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1991/128 |
| Խորագրեր: | |
| Առցանց հասանելիություն: | Full text available on IMF |
| Ամփոփում: | Evaluation of policy rules using empirical macroeconomic models is usually done on the assumption that the rules are perfectly credible. However, there are usually circumstances that cause the authorities to abandon any given rule. The public's expectations reflect this possibility. In the paper, credibility is assumed to depend on the probability that the authorities will abandon a rule because the resulting utility exceeds that from maintaining the rule. Simulations of a disinflation policy leading to price stability are presented. Its credibility varies over time, depending on the paths for output and inflation. |
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| Նյութի նկարագրություն: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Ֆիզիկական նկարագրություն: | 1 online resource (24 pages) |
| Ձևաչափ: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Հասանելի: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |