Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap : The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank /
An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This...
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| مؤلفون آخرون: | |
| التنسيق: | دورية |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2004.
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| سلاسل: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2004/162 |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Full text available on IMF |
| الملخص: | An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap. |
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| وصف المادة: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| وصف مادي: | 1 online resource (44 pages) |
| التنسيق: | Mode of access: Internet |
| تدمد: | 1018-5941 |
| وصول: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |