Deficit Limits, Budget Rules, and Fiscal Policy /
The paper presents a simple model for discussing the effects of deficit limits and budget rules on fiscal policy. I find that limits on deficit-output ratios provide incentives to implement procyclical policies when the economy is in intermediate states, and countercyclical policies only in very &qu...
| 第一著者: | |
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| フォーマット: | 雑誌 |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2005.
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| シリーズ: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2005/120 |
| オンライン･アクセス: | Full text available on IMF |
| 要約: | The paper presents a simple model for discussing the effects of deficit limits and budget rules on fiscal policy. I find that limits on deficit-output ratios provide incentives to implement procyclical policies when the economy is in intermediate states, and countercyclical policies only in very "good" and very "bad" economic times. As a result, fiscal "reaction functions" are not monotonically related to the state of the economy. Deficit limits are found to exert discipline only provided the limit is tight and the expected sanction large, albeit at a relatively large welfare cost. Moreover, when fiscal choices are made under a veil of ignorance about the output gap, an increase in volatility is likely to raise the level of the budget deficit. Finally, concerning the design of fiscal frameworks, when excessive deficits arise from a political bias, deficit limits should be symmetric and not state-contingent. |
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| 記述事項: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| 物理的記述: | 1 online resource (19 pages) |
| フォーマット: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| アクセス: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |