On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting /

This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future proba...

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Sonraí bibleagrafaíochta
Príomhchruthaitheoir: Bolt, Wilko
Rannpháirtithe: Tieman, Alexander
Formáid: IRIS
Teanga:English
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006.
Sraith:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/302
Ábhair:
WP
Rochtain ar líne:Full text available on IMF

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