Outcomes-Based Conditionality : Its Role and Optimal Design /
The paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of outcomesbased conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak...
| Príomhchruthaitheoir: | |
|---|---|
| Formáid: | IRIS |
| Teanga: | English |
| Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
|
| Sraith: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2006/128 |
| Ábhair: | |
| Rochtain ar líne: | Full text available on IMF |