Central Bank Boards Around the World : Why Does Membership Size Differ? /
This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is exam...
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| Awduron Eraill: | , |
| Fformat: | Cylchgrawn |
| Iaith: | English |
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Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
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| Cyfres: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2006/281 |
| Mynediad Ar-lein: | Full text available on IMF |
| Crynodeb: | This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards. |
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| Disgrifiad o'r Eitem: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Disgrifiad Corfforoll: | 1 online resource (46 pages) |
| Fformat: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Mynediad: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |