Imperfect Central Bank Communication : Information versus Distraction /
Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. Ther...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | , |
| Μορφή: | Επιστημονικό περιοδικό |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2008.
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| Σειρά: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2008/060 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full text available on IMF |
| Περίληψη: | Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. There is a risk that the central bank can distract the public; this means that the central bank may prefer to focus its communication policies on the information it knows most about. Indeed, conveying more certain information may improve the public's understanding to the extent that it "crowds out" a role for communicating imperfect information. |
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| Περιγραφή τεκμηρίου: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Φυσική περιγραφή: | 1 online resource (31 pages) |
| Μορφή: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Πρόσβαση: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |