Simple, Implementable Fiscal Policy Rules /
This paper analyzes the scope for systematic rules-based fiscal activism in open economies. Relative to a balanced budget rule, automatic stabilizers significantly improve welfare. But they minimize fiscal instrument volatility rather than business cycle volatility. A more aggressively countercyclic...
| Autor principal: | Kumhof, Michael |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | Laxton, Douglas |
| Formato: | Revista |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2009.
|
| Colección: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2009/076 |
| Acceso en línea: | Full text available on IMF |
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