Institutional Inertia /
We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing...
| मुख्य लेखक: | |
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| स्वरूप: | पत्रिका |
| भाषा: | English |
| प्रकाशित: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2009.
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| श्रृंखला: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2009/193 |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | Full text available on IMF |
| सारांश: | We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing rule. We show how this dynamic voting generates a systematic technological bias that is contingent on firm ownership. We provide conditions under which the pivotal voter's political leverage leads the firm to an institutional trap whereby majority voting and inefficient technology choice reinforce each other, leading to institutional inertia. |
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| वस्तु वर्णन: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| भौतिक वर्णन: | 1 online resource (25 pages) |
| स्वरूप: | Mode of access: Internet |
| आईएसएसएन: | 1018-5941 |
| अभिगमन: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |