Accounting discretion of banks during a financial crisis /

This paper shows that banks use accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. Banks' balance sheets overvalue real estate-related assets compared to the market value of these assets, especially during the U.S. mortgage crisis. Share prices of banks with large exposure to mo...

תיאור מלא

מידע ביבליוגרפי
מחבר ראשי: Laeven, Luc
מחברים אחרים: Huizinga, Harry
פורמט: כתב-עת
שפה:English
יצא לאור: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2009.
סדרה:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2009/207
גישה מקוונת:Full text available on IMF
תיאור
סיכום:This paper shows that banks use accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. Banks' balance sheets overvalue real estate-related assets compared to the market value of these assets, especially during the U.S. mortgage crisis. Share prices of banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also react favorably to recent changes in accounting rules that relax fair-value accounting, and these banks provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion in the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks.
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תיאור פיזי:1 online resource (41 pages)
פורמט:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
גישה:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students