Who Disciplines Bank Managers? /
We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeho...
| Հիմնական հեղինակ: | |
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| Այլ հեղինակներ: | , , |
| Ձևաչափ: | Ամսագիր |
| Լեզու: | English |
| Հրապարակվել է: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2009.
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| Շարք: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2009/272 |
| Առցանց հասանելիություն: | Full text available on IMF |
| Ամփոփում: | We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance. |
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| Նյութի նկարագրություն: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Ֆիզիկական նկարագրություն: | 1 online resource (45 pages) |
| Ձևաչափ: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Հասանելի: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |