Transparency and Ambiguity in Central Bank Safety Net Operations /
To mitigate the risks of contagion from problems arising in the banking sector, many countries operate some form of banking sector safety net. Such safety nets generally involve a judicious mixture of transparency and ambiguity. This ambiguity may be important to counter moral hazard effects but may...
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| Format: | Revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicat: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1997.
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| Col·lecció: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1997/138 |
| Accés en línia: | Full text available on IMF |
| Sumari: | To mitigate the risks of contagion from problems arising in the banking sector, many countries operate some form of banking sector safety net. Such safety nets generally involve a judicious mixture of transparency and ambiguity. This ambiguity may be important to counter moral hazard effects but may lead to excessive forbearance in the face of banking problems. While the scope for ambiguity has been declining, some ambiguity in the handling of individual institutions remains. In any case, ex post transparency is essential for reviewing the propriety of any assistance and preserving the authorities' future reputation and policy credibility. |
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| Descripció de l’ítem: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Descripció física: | 1 online resource (28 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Accés: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |