Contacts, Credibility and Common Knowledge : Their Influenceon Inflation Convergence.
This paper explains why sovereign issuers of reserve currencies do not use unexpected inflation to repudiate their foreign liabilities. Monetary restraint is exercised because of the fear that reserve users will switch to other currencies if an attempt is made to raise 'excessive' revenue....
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| Format: | Czasopismo |
| Język: | English |
| Wydane: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1989.
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| Seria: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1989/027 |
| Dostęp online: | Full text available on IMF |
| Streszczenie: | This paper explains why sovereign issuers of reserve currencies do not use unexpected inflation to repudiate their foreign liabilities. Monetary restraint is exercised because of the fear that reserve users will switch to other currencies if an attempt is made to raise 'excessive' revenue. By the same reasoning, capital flight can serve as a deterrent to excessive money creation. It is shown that even without policy precommitment or aversion to inflation, the availability of alternative currencies can support an equilibrium with a finite, time consistent inflation rate. |
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| Deskrypcja: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Opis fizyczny: | 1 online resource (18 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Ograniczenie dostępu: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |