The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession /
In this paper we consider a model of the country with heterogeneous population and examine compensation schemes that may prevent a threat of secession by dissatisfied regions. We show that horizontal imbalances are combatable with secession-proof compensation schemes that entail a degree of partial...
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| Format: | Revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicat: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
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| Col·lecció: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/176 |
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| Accés en línia: | Full text available on IMF |
| Sumari: | In this paper we consider a model of the country with heterogeneous population and examine compensation schemes that may prevent a threat of secession by dissatisfied regions. We show that horizontal imbalances are combatable with secession-proof compensation schemes that entail a degree of partial equalization: the disadvantageous regions should be subsidized but the burden on advantageous regions should not be too excessive. In the case of uniform distribution, we establish the 50-percent compensation rule for disadvantageous regions. Thus, we argue for a limited gap reduction between advantageous and disadvantageous regions and show that neither laissez faire nor Rawlsian allocation is secession-proof. |
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| Descripció de l’ítem: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Descripció física: | 1 online resource (36 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Accés: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |