Wage Centralization, Union Bargaining, and Macroeconomic Performance /
This paper addresses two questions. First, under what circumstances will a centralized wage-bargaining system offer higher output and employment than a decentralized system? Second, what is the relationship between the degree of wage centralization and inflation? The paper argues that centralized wa...
| Yazar: | |
|---|---|
| Materyal Türü: | Dergi |
| Dil: | English |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
|
| Seri Bilgileri: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2002/143 |
| Online Erişim: | Full text available on IMF |
| Özet: | This paper addresses two questions. First, under what circumstances will a centralized wage-bargaining system offer higher output and employment than a decentralized system? Second, what is the relationship between the degree of wage centralization and inflation? The paper argues that centralized wage setting may offer worse outcomes, despite the existence of a negative coordination externality in decentralized wage setting. This is more likely to occur when the legal and institutional environment strengthens the bargaining position of the union in the centralized regime compared with unions operating in a more decentralized regime. Furthermore, as product markets become more competitive, the macroeconomic outcomes in both regimes converge, and the degree of wage centralization becomes irrelevant. |
|---|---|
| Diğer Bilgileri: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Fiziksel Özellikler: | 1 online resource (26 pages) |
| Materyal Türü: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Erişim: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |