The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard) /
Using a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends at an actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs in response to IMF crisis lending are efficient. T...
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| Tác giả khác: | |
| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2004.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2004/192 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |
| Tóm tắt: | Using a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends at an actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs in response to IMF crisis lending are efficient. Thus, under these assumptions, the IMF cannot cause moral hazard, as argued by Michael Mussa (1999, 2004). It follows that examining the effects of IMF lending on capital flows or borrowing costs is not a useful strategy to test for IMF-induced moral hazard. Instead, empirical research on moral hazard should focus on the assumptions of the Mussa theorem. |
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| Mô tả sách: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Mô tả vật lý: | 1 online resource (25 pages) |
| Định dạng: | Mode of access: Internet |
| số ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Truy cập: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |