Trade-offs in Bank Resolution /
This SDN revisits the debate on bank resolution regimes, first by presenting a simple model of bank insolvency that transparently describes the trade-off involved between bail-outs, bail-ins, and larger capital buffers. The note then looks for empirical evidence to assess the moral hazard consequenc...
| מחבר ראשי: | |
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| מחברים אחרים: | , , |
| פורמט: | כתב-עת |
| שפה: | English |
| יצא לאור: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2018.
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| סדרה: | Staff Discussion Notes; Staff Discussion Notes ;
No. 2018/002 |
| גישה מקוונת: | Full text available on IMF |
| סיכום: | This SDN revisits the debate on bank resolution regimes, first by presenting a simple model of bank insolvency that transparently describes the trade-off involved between bail-outs, bail-ins, and larger capital buffers. The note then looks for empirical evidence to assess the moral hazard consequences of bail-outs and the systemic spillovers from bail-ins. |
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| תאור פריט: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| תיאור פיזי: | 1 online resource (42 pages) |
| פורמט: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 2617-6750 |
| גישה: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |