Winning Connections? : Special Interests and the Sale of Failed Banks /
We study how lobbying affects the resolution of failed banks, using a sample of FDIC auctions between 2007 and 2014. We show that bidding banks that lobby regulators have a higher probability of winning an auction. In addition, the FDIC incurs higher costs in such auctions, amounting to 16.4 percent...
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| 其他作者: | , , |
| 格式: | 雜誌 |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2017.
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| 叢編: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2017/262 |
| 在線閱讀: | Full text available on IMF |