The Limits of Meritocracy /
We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce t...
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| مؤلفون آخرون: | , |
| التنسيق: | دورية |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2018.
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| سلاسل: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2018/231 |
| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Full text available on IMF |
| الملخص: | We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity. |
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| وصف المادة: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| وصف مادي: | 1 online resource (87 pages) |
| التنسيق: | Mode of access: Internet |
| تدمد: | 1018-5941 |
| وصول: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |