Fund Financial Support and Moral Hazard : Analytics and Empirics.
Since Fund financial support helps reduce the expected cost of crises, members and markets might engage in greater risk-taking; in other words, moral hazard. Empirically, however, the Fund's rate of charge has adequately reflected the default risk it faces and the high political, social, and ec...
| Corporate Author: | International Monetary Fund |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2007.
|
| Series: | Policy Papers; Policy Paper ;
No. 2007/003 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
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