Sovereign Debt Standstills /

As a response to economic crises triggered by COVID-19, sovereign debt standstill proposals emphasize debt payment suspensions without haircuts on the face value of debt obligations. We quantify the effects of standstills using a standard default model. We find that a one-year standstill generates w...

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গ্রন্থ-পঞ্জীর বিবরন
প্রধান লেখক: Hatchondo, Juan Carlos
অন্যান্য লেখক: Martinez, Leonardo, Sosa Padilla, Cesar
বিন্যাস: পত্রিকা
ভাষা:English
প্রকাশিত: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2020.
মালা:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2020/290
অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন:Full text available on IMF
বিবরন
সংক্ষিপ্ত:As a response to economic crises triggered by COVID-19, sovereign debt standstill proposals emphasize debt payment suspensions without haircuts on the face value of debt obligations. We quantify the effects of standstills using a standard default model. We find that a one-year standstill generates welfare gains for the sovereign equivalent to a permanent consumption increase of between 0.1% and 0.3%, depending on the initial shock. However, except when it avoids a default, the standstill also implies capital losses for creditors of between 9% and 27%, which is consistent with their reluctance to participate in these operations and indicates that this reluctance would persist even without a free-riding or holdout problem. Standstills also generate a form of 'debt overhang' and thus the opportunity for a 'voluntary debt exchange': complementing the standstill with haircuts could reduce creditors' losses and simultaneously increase welfare gains. Our results cast doubts on the emphasis on standstills without haircuts.
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দৈহিক বর্ননা:1 online resource (27 pages)
বিন্যাস:Mode of access: Internet
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